Superluminal Signalling by Weinstein, Steven
Superluminal Signalling∗
Steven Weinstein
Abstract
Special relativity is said to prohibit faster-than-light (superluminal) signalling, yet contro-
versy regularly arises as to whether this or that physical phenomenon violates the prohibition.
I argue that the controversy is a result of a lack of clarity as to what it means to signal, and I
propose a criterion. I show that although we have no reason to think that one can send signals
faster than light, this is not prohibited by special relativity.
1 Introduction
Special relativity originated as a way of accounting for the invariance of the laws of electromagnetism
under the spatial and temporal coordinate transformations known as the Lorentz transformations.
Whereas Lorentz understood length contraction and time dilation as changes in the properties of
material bodies, Einstein was able to derive these transformations from two postulates: (1) the laws
of nature look the same to all inertial (unaccelerated) observers; (2) the speed of light in a vacuum
is constant, invariant under changes of reference frame. The former is simply a reaffirmation
of Galileos principle of relativity, while the latter appears to contradict it. It was Einsteins
genius to see that these could be reconciled, and in fact are reconciled, by treating the Lorentz
transformations as changes in the spatial and temporal coordinates associated with different inertial
observers. One consequence of this is the relativity of simultaneity.
The existence of a Þnite, invariant speed of light in vacuum suggested early on that it would be
impossible to send signals faster than light, and Einsteins attribution of this limit to the structure
of space-time itself suggested that in fact all physical Þelds would be subject to this limitation. Yet
arguments to this effect are nowhere to be found in Einsteins original work, which was primarily
concerned with the propagation of electromagnetic radiation (light) and the dynamics of charged
objects interacting with this radiation. Maxwells equations do not place any restriction on the
current, and one can ask, (as Sommerfeld (1905) did) though perhaps not deÞnitively answer, what
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sort of Þeld would be associated with a superluminal current. Though Einstein and others realized
that the theory also implied that one could not accelerate massive objects up to or past the speed
of light (due to the increase of mass with velocity), it was early on noted that it might be possible
to have massive objects which always moved faster than light (Sommerfelds tachyon).1
Nonetheless, it is commonly asserted that special relativity rules out the possibility of sending
signals faster than light, of superluminal signalling. However, it is well-known that there are phys-
ical phenomena perfectly compatible with special relativity in which something travels faster than
light. Thus accounts of such phenomena are usually accompanied by disclaimers explaining why
the phenomenon in question cannot be used to send signals faster than light. In this the discussion
has much in common with the discussion of Maxwells Demon, a long-lived phantasm from the
19th-century whose activity would bring about violations of the second law of thermodynamics.
In both cases, convictions run deep, but refutation is far from general. (See Leff & Rex (1990),
Weinstein (2003)).
Perhaps the primary obstruction to attaining clarity on the relation between special relativity
and the purported prohibition of superluminal signalling has to do with articulating just what a
prohibition against superluminal signalling amounts to, while a secondary obstruction involves a
clariÞcation of the strictures imposed by special relativity. With regard to the latter, I will simply
take special relativity to be the theory that says that the laws of nature are Lorentz-invariant.
That is to say that all inertial frames are on an equal footing (as in Galilean relativity) and that
the transformations between inertial frames are Lorentz transformations.
The characterization of superluminal signalling is less straightforward. There are a variety of
approaches to the analysis of signalling in the literature. One school of thought is concerned with
identifying physical objects or phenomena, e.g. marks (Reichenbach, 1958; Salmon, 1998) or
wave-pulses (Brillouin, 1960; Jackson, et al., 2001), which are understood to correspond to signals,
and evaluating whether these objects can travel faster than light, i.e. whether their trajectories
can be spacelike. Another school is primarily concerned with analyzing the correlations between
signalling events and other, distant events, identifying whether relativistic constraints on such
correlations preclude spacelike-separated transmission and reception. While the former approach
suffers from a disregard for the connection (argued for below) between signalling and intervention,
the latter suffers from a tendency to downplay the role of the equations of motion. The approach
offered in this paper is something of a synthesis of the two, and may even strike some as a pedantic
reÞnement of existing notions. However, the reÞnement allows one to see more clearly both the
perspectival aspect of signalling (related to the subjectivity of intervention) and the absence of a
1Here the theory includes the Lorentz force law, which gives the force exerted on an electric current by the Þeld.
This law is consistent with, but not directly derivable from, Maxwells equations.
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special relativity-derived prohibition on superluminal signalling.
2 Signals
A signal is often understood as some sort of disturbance that propagates through spacetime. Yet
when we look at one or more Þelds in a single spacetime, how are we to identify the relevant
disturbances? Suppose we wish to study the signal broadcast by a radio station. This is just
electromagnetic radiation, and there is much electromagnetic radiation propagating through our
atmosphere (other radio stations, GPS signals, etc.) and indeed through the cosmos (stellar radi-
ation, galactic jets, microwave background). In practice, we extract the signal using an antenna,
which is sensitive to a limited range of wavelengths. Of course, this doesnt really work all the time
 sunspot activity has a way of intruding on radio transmission, for example.
Even if we succeed in identifying some characteristic signal from amidst the background, we
have to identify a moment of transmission and a moment of reception in order to deÞne a velocity
for that signal. (Of course, we should also identify the frame of reference.) If the transmission
and the reception are spacelike, we say the signal has been transmitted superluminally; otherwise,
not.2 Viewed purely in terms of the signal, this is somewhat problematic. Ordinary signals are
extended in space and time. Think of the word one, for instance  as a written symbol, it is spread
out in space; as a soundwave or radio transmission, it is a wave-pulse extended in space and time
(HopÞeld & Brody, 2000, 2001). If we want to talk about the velocity of propagation of the signal
associated with this pulse, we need to identify which part of the pulse at which time corresponds
to the initiation or transmission of the signal, and similarly for the reception.
Let us simplify a bit and think of a smooth pulse in a single spatial dimension. Ones intuition
might be that it doesnt matter which part of the pulse one looks at, for as long as it is transmitted
accurately, the entire structure will move as one. However, this is not the case, in general, for
even if the pulse retains its shape, the velocity of the peak (the group velocity) need not equal
the velocity of the leading edge. In other words, the pulse will generally spread or be otherwise
distorted, unless it is a linear Þeld propagating in a vacuum. Sommerfeld and Brillouin (both in
Brillouin (1960)) noted that certain velocities associated with light propagation, e.g. the group
velocity of a wave-packet in a dispersive medium, could in fact be faster than light. In recent
years such phenomena have been realized in the laboratory (Wang, et al., 2000), while all along it
has been clear that there are many physical phenomena  for example, a shadow cast by a moving
object on a distant surface  which can move faster than light.
If we are to settle on a candidate for the portion of the pulse that is to correspond to the
2Signals that travel into the past lightcone are said to have negative but subluminal velocity.
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transmission of a signal, we might well settle on the leading edge. Why? Because it corresponds to
the initiation of the pulse, and we feel that this is the earliest time at which the signal could be said
to have been induced. And indeed, this choice is salutary in that the leading edge of a light-pulse
never travels faster than c.
A signiÞcant problem with this leading edge deÞnition is the problem of noise. (See Garrison, et
al. (1998)) Signals in the real world do not propagate against noiseless backgrounds. As a result,
the leading edge of a pulse (or, for that matter, any part of the pulse) can be ampliÞed, destroyed,
or otherwise distorted by constructive or destructive interference. It is entirely unclear how to
identify physically the leading edge through these various changes. In general, the issue here is
whether there are suitable criteria of identity for wavelike phenomena.3
Even in the absence of noise, the leading edge deÞnition tells us little of interest about cases in
which the pulse is reßected or absorbed. Consider the following example. Take a laser pointer and
point it at, say, the surface of the moon. Sweep it across the surface as fast as you can. If you do
it in less than 1/30th of a second, then the spot will move across the face of the moon at greater
than the speed of light.
If you point the laser at the moon and switch it on, this certainly may be understood as sending
a signal, from the laser to the moon. The spot on the moon corresponds to the continuation of the
signal, and the spot moves across the moon faster than light. Yet we do not say that the signal itself
moves faster than light, that information moves faster than light, for this phenomenon apparently
cannot be used to send information from one side of the moon to the other.
Now there is one line of thinking (Salmon, 1998; Steinberg, 2000) according to which the
propagation of the spot is a pseudopropagation, pseudo because a spot is (supposedly) not a
real thing. However, it is difficult to conceive of a generic way to distinguish between real things
and pseudo things in classical physics (and it is not much easier to conceive of such a distinction
in quantum theory). In classical theory, one sometimes has particles with deÞnite trajectories that
allow one to identify the particles over time. But it is hard to see what to say about classical
Þelds and the identity of waves and other disturbances over time.4 So I think this approach is
unproÞtable.
3A related problem for the leading edge deÞnition has to do with the indeÞnability of the leading edge in cases of
frequency modulation. Suppose we have a continuous coherent beam of red light, and we wish to send a signal by
changing the frequency of light, so that it is blueshifted. (This is the sort of thing Reichenbach (1958) had in mind
when he talked about the transmission of marks.) There is no particular point in the beam of light corresponding
to the leading edge of the blueshifted pulsethere is no single point at which the light changes from red to blue.
4 In quantum theory there are Þeld quanta, but no associated trajectories, and furthermore there are various sorts
of cases where the fundamental particle ontology is ambiguous. I am thinking here of (a) the Unruh effect, in which
inertial and accelerating observers differ on whether there are particles in some region of space, and (b) the physics
of the strong interaction, in which one may regard either quarks and gluons or hadrons as fundamental. See, e.g.,
Wald (1994) for the former, and Shifman (2001) for the latter.
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3 Signalling
Recall that our study of signal propagation required identiÞcation of some event corresponding to
the initiation of the signal. This suggests that, rather than following the trajectory of the signal, we
should focus on the effects associated with the events that correspond to the initiation of a signal.
Though this might seem to require a full-blown theory of causation, we will see that it does not.
Suppose you decide to use your laser pointer to send a message. In practice, there are any
number of events that might be said to correspond to the initiation of the message. First, you
form an intention, then your Þnger moves, closing a switch, then the device warms up, then the
laser light is emitted. Which of these events (in the nontechnical sense of spatially and temporally
extended phenomena) corresponds to the initiation of the signal depends on just what physical
system is deemed to be the medium of communication, and on what physical system corresponds
to the user (animate or otherwise) of the medium. So for example one might consider the vacuum
or the atmosphere the medium, and the laser the agent, or one might consider the laser and the
vacuum (or the atmosphere) the medium, and the person the agent, and so on.
Whatever the medium is, its behavior will be understood to be deterministic, in a broad sense.
That is, I will suppose that, given the state of the medium at some time, we will be able to predict
the state at any future (or for that matter, past) time.5 The medium need not be a closed system; a
radio transmitter requires an external power source (hence it is an open system), yet the composite
system consisting of the transmitter plus empty space is, for my purposes, a perfectly good medium.
To send information, to signal, is to interact physically with the signalling medium. On the
proposed analysis, a signal is simply a disturbance of the medium. A disturbance is understood to
be an externally induced change in the state of the medium at some time and place. This is to say,
it is a change which does not follow from what came before. The disturbance may be extended
in time (speech) or space (think of dropping a rock into a pond), and may even occur at different
times and places. The signal will generally be brought about via interaction with some external
physical system, be it an animate or an inanimate object. However, the nature of this external
system plays no role in our discussion - what is important is simply that it effects some sort of
change in the signalling medium.6
5More formally, this amounts to the requirement that the differential equations describing the evolution of the
signalling medium have a well-posed initial value formulation.
6The technically-minded reader may think of a disturbance as the introduction of a forcing term into the
Hamiltonian.
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4 Superluminality
In order to judge whether a signal can be transmitted at superluminal speed, I propose that we
do the following. Consider the time-development of the signalling medium on its own. This will
naturally require:
 identiÞcation of the signalling medium, generally in terms of its degrees of freedom (e.g., Þeld
values; particle positions and momenta),
 speciÞcation of the equations of motion for these degrees of freedom (the dynamical laws),
and
 speciÞcation of default initial data, i.e., values for these degrees of freedom at some time.
If there is a well-posed initial value formulation for the equations of motion, and if the initial data
are appropriate,7 then there will be a unique solution, which is to say a well-deÞned and unique
future development of the undisturbed medium.
Note that the signalling medium and its default behavior is represented by a particular solution
to a set of equations of motion. In the realm of media governed by Maxwells equations, it may
be a trivial solution such as the vacuum solution, or it may be a non-trivial solution, such as the
carrier wave for a radio broadcast. A river ßowing at some Þxed rate might could be a signalling
medium, as could a pond. (In the general case, one might wish to consider ensembles of initial
data, and consequently ensembles of solutions.)
Now consider the time-development of a signalling medium which undergoes a disturbance. I.e.,
consider what happens when you make some (typically local) change in the initial data. As long
as the new initial-value problem is again well-posed, the time development of the system will be
unique, and will thus differ from that of the original system at various points in the future. If
the system is made up of Þelds, then the set of points where the solutions Þrst differ will be a 3-
dimensional hypersurface which I will call the Surface of First Disturbance (SFD). (If the system is
made up only of particles, then there will be a set of characteristic points in spacetime at which the
particle trajectories differ from those in the undisturbed solution.) My proposal is that a classical
theory allows superluminal signalling if and only if there is a signalling medium (a solution to the
equations of motion) the disturbance of which gives rise to an SFD which contains at least one
point that is spacelike to all points of the initial disturbance. (See Figures 1a and 1b) Conversely,
7Proofs of the existence and uniqueness of solutions for systems of partial differential equations assume that the
initial data and the solution have some degree or other of differentiability (e.g., C3) (see Courant (1962)). What
degree is deemed to be appropriate is a matter that I do not address in this article.
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if no signalling medium exists that allows such a disturbance, then no superluminal signalling is
possible.
Disturbing a signalling medium amounts to interfering in the time-development of the medium.
We then determine whether a signal (an initial disturbance) can propagate faster than light by
comparing the evolution of the perturbed intial data to the counterfactual evolution, identifying
the effect of the signal by comparing the actual evolution with what the evolution would have been.
Ordinarily, such analyses of cause and effect are plagued by ambiguity, as one is hard-pressed to
identify, in general, how things would have been had some event (the cause) not occurred. For
instance, one might want to justify the claim that my dialing a certain number caused another
telephone to ring by appealing to the intuition that had I not dialled the number, the phone would
not have rung.8 This is subject to the counterargument that the phone would have rung if someone
else had dialled the number.
A common sort of response to this puzzle about counterfactual analyses of causality is to
propose that, in determining what would have happened had the purported cause not taken place,
one leave everything else the same. Thus one is explicitly blocked from considering a world in
which someone else dials the same phone number. However, such a response is problematic if
one is considering worlds in their entirety, because a world in which you did not dial the phone
number is a world with a different past than the world you inhabit, insofar as you are a phyical
object governed by deterministic laws. Though there are ways around even this objection, we will
not consider them, because it is here that the counterfactual analysis of signalling differs from
counterfactual analyses of causation. In the analysis of signalling, we identify certain parts of
the world as evolving deterministically, and other parts of the world as intruding (or not) on this
subsystem, and disturbing it. This buys us freedom from the ambiguities involved in evaluating
counterfactuals, since we can hold the signalling medium Þxed.
The price of this freedom is that the identiÞcation of the subsystem in any given situation is
purely up to us, and thus any ontological conclusions are blocked. Although I am free to regard
my picking up the phone as a signalling event, an event which brings about a disturbance of a
signalling medium (the telephone system) including the ringing of a distant phone, I am precluded
from deÞnitively describing the dialling as a cause of the ringing. Whereas the signalling claim
is based on a conception of the world as comprising subsystems (particularly, signalling media)
which are subject to external intervention (or, if you like, control: see the Appendix for further
discussion), a full causal analysis typically regards the world in its entirety, and attempts to attribute
causal relations to events therein.9
8Several good papers on the counterfactual analysis of causation are collected in Collins, et al. (2003).
9The necessity of identifying states of subsystems of the world, and subsequently analyzing various possible
interventions, has much in common with the Copenhagen approach to quantum theory, whereby one regards state
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The following sections discuss some important qualiÞcations to the signalling criterion.
4.1 Localization of disturbance
Though the initial disturbance will typically be restricted to a Þnite spacetime region, we are free
to consider local disturbances in several spatial regions, at the same or different times. If any point
on the resulting SFD is spacelike to every point in all of these regions, then we say that a signal
has been sent superluminally.
4.2 Initial value formulation
My characterization of signalling assumes that the initial data at some time determine the solution
for all future times. Whether this actually is the case depends on the equations of motion.10 For
many generic sorts of matter with generic initial conditions, there is indeed a well-posed initial-value
formulation. On the other hand, this is certainly not the case for all the types of matter that can
be described in a special-relativistic context. (Indeed, gauge theories are counterexamples, though
the non-uniqueness there is of a rather trivial sort.) For example, the equations of motion for
dust do not have a well-posed initial-value formulation, interestingly enough (see Geroch (1996)).
On the other hand, the absence of an initial value formulation indicates a breakdown in de-
terminism for the system under consideration, and it is hard to see this as opening the door to
the possibility of signalling, since signalling implies that the initial signal (disturbance) determines
(perhaps probabilistically) the behavior at later times. A complete failure of predictability can be
seen as defeating the possibility of signalling.11
The third and perhaps most intriguing possibility is that of a world in which Lorentz-invariant
equations of motion have an initial value formulation, but in which the future (past) domain of
dependence of a point on the initial data surface lies outside the future (past) lightcone at that
point. An example of such a system is a relativistic perfect ßuid with sound-speed v > c (where v
is measured in the rest frame of the ßuid). In this case, it is possible to Þnd a spacelike surface (an
instant of time) with respect to which the evolution of the system is well-deÞned. (One simply
needs to Þnd a frame of reference with respect to which the sound-speed is non-negative and use a
surface of simultaneity associated with that frame.)
preparations and measurement outcomes as being brought about by free manipulation of external, classical apparatus.
10 It also depends on the initial data. (See previous footnote.)
11This is not meant to preclude the possibility of signalling media which obey probabilistic laws, such as those
encountered in quantum mechanics. It is probably sufficient, but not necessary, for the evolution of the probabilities to
be deterministic (as in quantum theory), though non-Markovian probabilities would seem to represent an interesting
borderline case.
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It is in the context of this sort of system (hyperbolic but non-causal, in the jargon of Geroch
(1996)) that one should expect the possibility of superluminal signalling. In other words, if one
were to describe the signalling medium as simply a perfect ßuid with sound-speed v > c, then one
would expect that the SFD would be spacelike to some initial disturbance.
4.3 Sufficiency and necessity
I have proposed a condition for superluminal signalling which I regard as uniquely sufficient. In
light of the considerations just above, I am inclined to require the existence of a well-posed initial-
value formulation as a necessary condition. That is, the question of whether or not superluminal
signalling is possible does not even get off the ground in the absence of a medium whose state
evolves in a predictable (even if stochastic) way. Taken together, these conditions constitute a kind
of operational deÞnition of superluminal signalling.
5 No-go theorem?
Given the criterion I have proposed, there is a clear sense in which special relativity does permit
superluminal signalling, in that one can construct (deterministic), Lorentz-invariant equations of
motion in Minkowski spacetime that describe the behavior of a signalling medium, and which have
the property that the SFD resulting from a typical disturbance has points which are spacelike to
all of the points in the disturbance. (Technically, this means that the characteristic surfaces are
null or timelike.)
Not only does special relativity permit such Þelds; there are several sorts which have actu-
ally received extensive discussion in the physics literature. Least radical is ordinary quantum
electrodynamics itself, considered in a curved background. There, it has been shown that vac-
uum polarization effects may induce corrections to the effective classical action such that photons
propagate outside of the lightcone (Drummond & Hathrell, 1980; Shore, 1996). Then there are
nonlinear modiÞcations of electrodynamics, the most well-known of which is Born-Infeld (1934)
theory, originally proposed as an alternative to ordinary Maxwell theory which did not suffer from
the divergent self-energy associated with classical point sources. It was largely abandoned as a
serious candidate for fundamental theory because of difficulties in quantization, but has recently
re-emerged as an object of study in the context of string theory (Gibbons & Herdeiro, 2001). It has
been well-known for some time (Plebanski, 1970; Boillat, 1970) that the theory admits superluminal
propagation. More speciÞcally, there are solutions to the Born-Infeld equations of motion which
have perturbations that propagate outside the light cone. Therefore, if we take one such solution
to be descriptive of a possible signalling medium, then there exist SFDs which are spacelike with
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respect to some set of initial disturbances.
Another class of relativistic theories allowing superluminal signalling are those derived from
a k-essence Lagrangian (Armendariz-Picon, et al. (2001)). These describe scalar Þelds with a
nonlinear kinetic term, and have been proposed in order to generate a time-dependent cosmological
constant in an attempt to account for recent observations. Here, too, there are solutions to the Þeld
equations which exhibit superluminal propagation in the relevant sense. (Erickson, et al. (2002);
Garriga & Mukhanov, 1999)
Can one give anything like a no-go theorem for superluminal signalling? For a situation in
which the signalling medium is just the free, classical Maxwell Þeld, and in which the initial data
are appropriately differentiable, one can show that no superluminal signalling (in the present sense)
can take place. However, one might wonder about the solutions of Maxwells equations for non-
differentiable initial data (for example, from shock waves). One then enters the realm of so-called
weak solutions of the equations of motion, which are typically nonunique, and require additional
entropy conditions to single out a particular solution.
Furthermore, there are physical systems which generically develop singularities (perhaps shocks,
perhaps not) in Þnite time which do not lend themselves to analysis in terms of weak solutions and
entropy conditions. For instance, the equations for a three-dimensional compressible perfect ßuid
(the compressible Euler equations) generically give rise to shocks in Þnite time (see Sideris (1985)).
For such systems, it may be impossible to predict their behavior after a Þnite time, and thus a
general no-superluminal signalling proof is impossible.12
In short, superluminal signalling, as understood in this paper, is compatible with special rela-
tivity. However, the relativistic equations of motion we are most familiar with, such as those for
the electromagnetic Þeld (described by Maxwell theory) and those for relativistic ßuids, do not give
any indication of allowing superluminal signalling.
6 Quantum Signalling
What then of quantum theory? Though it is often claimed that the postulates of relativistic
quantum theory preclude superluminal signalling (Bell, 1975; Maudlin, 2002), the situation turns
out to involve new subtleties. However, one can at least address the question using the basic
framework discussed above, except that instead of describing the signalling medium as a classical
system evolving under classical equations of motion, one should describe it as a quantum system
evolving under quantum equations of motion. The relevant initial disturbances are now local
12 Investigating such systems in a Newtonian context, Earman (1986) concludes that such singular behavior corre-
sponds to a failure of determinism.
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operators on the initial state, and the question becomes whether the action of such operators
brings about a change in the expectation value of any quantity deÞned over some region which is
spacelike to the initial disturbance.
The question of superluminal signalling in quantum theory has been addressed in a variety of
ways in the literature. One oft-cited paper by Ghirardi, et al. (1980) entitled A general argument
against superluminal transmission through the quantum mechanical measurement process does
not really live up to the generality claimed in the title, but does provide an argument against
the possibility of exploiting measurements on entangled particles to transmit information faster
than light. The work of Shimony (1984) and Redhead (1986) is in a similar vein. All of these
describe the possible manipulations of quantum systems by local unitary operators representing
manipulations on individual, spatiotemporally isolated parts of the system under consideration.
They do not, however, address at least two important issues.
One such issue has to do with dynamics. All of the treatments cited invoke the assumption
that the entangled systems are non-interacting. This is a rather strong assumption, and one which
is particularly out of place if one is inquiring into the possibility of signalling from one region to an-
other. All of the classical signalling scenarios discussed above involve interacting systems. What
then of interacting, relativistic quantum systems? Can one have a Lorentz-invariant quantum sig-
nalling medium which allows superluminal signalling? This is an open question, to my knowledge.
Though standard relativistic quantum Þeld theory incorporates causality by requiring that space-
like observables commute, it is by no means obvious that this requirement is appropriate for, and
even consistent with, equations of motion which exhibit superluminal propagation of disturbances.13
Given the assumption that there are no interactions between the two entangled particles, can one
safely assert, in light of the proofs alluded to, that no measurements allow superluminal signalling?
Surprisingly, the answer appears to be no. Recent work of Beckman, et al. (2001), drawing
on earlier work of Sorkin (1993), demonstrates that there exist quantities, represented by bounded
self-adjoint operators, the measurement of which would allow superluminal signalling. Consider two
observers, Alice and Bob, each equipped with a two-state quantum system (e.g. the two spin-states
of an electron). Alice starts with |0i, and Bob selects either |0i or |1i at time t0. Thus the initial
state is |00i or |01i. At time t0+%, a partial measurement is made on the system, represented by the
projection operator onto the state ψ = 1√
2
(|00i+ |11i). At time t0+2%, Alice measures her particle.
If Bob began with state |1i, then Alice will obtain |0i with certainty. But if Bob prepared his
13The problem here is that one requires the operators (in the Heisenberg picture) to satisfy the equations of motion
for the Þeld, and that this in turn implies that some operators at spacelike points may not commute if the equations
of motion exhibit superluminal propagation. Simply requiring the operators at spacelike points to commute would
seem to preclude satisfying the equations of motion. This dilemma is closely related to the problem of constructing
a quantum theory of gravity, in which the causal structure is itself a dynamical variable.
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particle in |0i, then there is a 50% chance that Alice will obtain |1i. Thus if such a measurement
is possible, it would appear that Bob can (with 50% reliability) signal Alice instantaneously (in
the limit % → 0). Sorkin (1993) and Beckman, et al. (2002) both conclude that this indicates
that relativistic quantum theory tolerates a much more restricted selection of observables than is
normally assumed. I believe that this conclusion is incorrect; for further discussion, see Weinstein
(2002).
7 Conclusion and Prospectus
The question of the possibility of superluminal signalling in classical, relativistic physics is here
understood as an inquiry into the effects of various sorts of disturbance on a Lorentz-invariant
signalling medium. The effects of disturbances are unambiguously ascertainable because the sig-
nalling medium itself is understood to be a subsystem of the universe, the undisturbed behavior
of which is well-deÞned. Superluminal signalling is possible if there exist signalling media such
that some (or all) disturbances of the medium result in an SFD which is spacelike to all points of
the initial disturbance. The question of the compatibility of superluminal signalling and relativity
theory is here understood as an inquiry into whether there exist (on paper) any such signalling
media obeying Lorentz-invariant equations of motion. The answer is, Yes.
To put the matter less technically, the idea in this paper is simply that evaluating the speed
of signalling is a matter of evaluating the effects of kicking something. This something is not a
member of a distinct ontological category, signalling media; the world does not contain a natural
division between signalling media and the objects which disturb them. Like computers, signalling
media are perhaps best regarded as physical systems over which we have some relevant (to us)
level of control. I do not, however, think that there is any fact of the matter as to what we can
and cannot control, and so unlike Bell (see Appendix), I do not think that there is any need for a
fragment of a [physical] theory of human beings. (Bell 1975, 60) Signalling is about what we can
and cannot bring about, and thus the study of signalling relies on a conception of what is going
on in the world that allows for agency. To the extent that ones conception is at odds with this,
to the extent that one views agents and signalling media alike as parts of a deterministic machine,
one cannot see signalling in nature at all.14
Though a point of view that requires a split between physical system and external agent may be
anathema to many, it is well worth noting that something very similar is assumed when applying
14Talk of signalling (and causation) in a cosmological context is, I would argue, predicated on an implicit split of
the universe into signalling medium and perturbations external to the medium. For example, when we speak of the
transit time for signals broadcast from a supernova in a distant galaxy, the undisturbed medium is the intergalactic
vacuum, and perhaps the other stars and galaxies, understood to be evolving in an uninteresting fashion.
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both quantum mechanics and thermodynamics to actual physical situations. When applying
quantum theory, one must make a conceptual split between the observer or measuring apparatus
and the quantum system under study. The line between the two is movable, just as the line
between external intervention and signalling medium is movable. The theory is ultimately about
predictions of measurements on systems described quantum mechanically, and these measurement
results are described classically. Similarly, thermodynamics is in large part about subsystems of
the universe (thermodynamic systems!), and manipulations thereof, which may elicit a cost in work
done or a beneÞt in work extracted, depending on whether the manipulation results in a decrease or
increase in entropy. Assigning a quantum state to the entire universe, or assigning a temperature or
an entropy to the universe as a whole, is arguably incoherent, just as regarding the entire universe
as a signalling medium (kicked by what?) is incoherent.15 I believe these analogies are highly
suggestive, and worthy of further investigation.
8 Appendix: Maudlins analysis
Tim Maudlins (2002) book is an extensive discussion of the compatibility of special relativity
and quantum theory, with a chapter dedicated to discussing superluminal signalling and relativity.
Though he and I agree that relativity does not preclude superluminal signalling, our analyses are
different in a non-trivial way.
Maudlins position is that superluminal signalling does not constitute a violation of relativity
unless it would allow us to pick out a particular Lorentz frame as holding a privileged position in
nature. (102) Here I am more or less in agreement, as it would seem that one could pick out a
particular Lorentz frame if and only if the equations of motion of the signalling medium are not
Lorentz-invariant. Maudlin goes on to say that whether or not this is the case depends on the
details of the superluminal transmission, on the exact connection between the emission of the signal
and its reception.(102) I agree with this as well, but have a different sense of what these details
amount to.
As in my treatment, Maudlin is primarily concerned to analyze the effects of signalling, rather
than the trajectories of signals. More speciÞcally, he looks at the transmission and the reception
of the signal. What is a signal? According to Maudlin, A signal requires a correlation between
a controllable physical state and an observable one, the source of the signal being identiÞed not by
its position in time but by its controllability. (Maudlin 2002, 100) Maudlin offers as an example
of a signalling mechanism a button which can be pushed and a lamp which goes on and off.
15An illuminating discussion of the dependence of entropy on the macroscopic description may be found in Jaynes
(1992).
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The signal is understood to be transmitted when the button is pressed, and received when the lamp
goes on (or off). Little is said about how this is supposed to generalize, other than that Maudlin
requires that [t]he button can be treated as a free variable in the sense that it can be coupled to
any manner of device which will determine its state. By free variable, Maudlin do[es] not mean
to conjure up the idea that the button pushers must have free will in some deep, metaphysical
sense. Rather, he means that the button can be coupled to a mechanism whose workings are
predictable and well understood. The mechanism then determines the state of the button.
One difficulty with this account is that it is unclear whether controllability is intended to pick
out a unique event corresponding to the initiation of the signal. What corresponds to the moment
of button-pushing when I sit down at my computer and type and send an email? This problem
stems from the vagueness of the notion of controllability. Such vagueness might seem puzzling in
a work explicitly inspired by the the work of John Bell, as Bell (1987) famously inveighed against
the unprofessionally vague character of conventional formulations of quantum Þeld theory. (173),
particularly with respect to the use of the term measurement. Yet Bell (1975) himself is quite
vague when exploring the compatibility of quantum Þeld theory and the (supposed) relativistic
prohibition against superluminal signalling. He writes,
Can we then signal faster than light? To answer this we need at least a schematic theory
of what we can do, a fragment of a theory of human beings. Suppose we can control
variables like a and b above, but not those like A and B. I do not quite know what
like means here, but suppose that beables somehow fall into two classes, controllables
and uncontrollables. The latter are of no use for sending signals, but can be used for
reception. (60)
This is clearly the (vague) strategy followed by Maudlin (for whom signal reception is similarly
broadly deÞned).
In contrast, the approach taken in this paper does not invoke a notion of controllability, nor of
predictable...mechanism. Rather, one simply considers all perturbations of a given, well-deÞned
signalling medium. This approach is not immediately available to Maudlin because he does not
discuss signalling media. However, I believe that it is in the spirit of his approach.
Because he does not discuss signalling media, per se, Maudlin, like Bell, does not explicitly
consider the role of equations of motion, of dynamics. Thus although he appears to endorse Lorentz-
invariance as the deÞning property of a special relativistic theory, and although he recognizes what
many miss, that Lorentz invariance does not preclude superluminal signalling, his analysis is based
on an analysis of whether certain kinds of signalling could be used to deÞne a preferred reference
frame. The analysis here, by contrast, construes special relativity as simply the demand for Lorentz-
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invariant equations of motion, and considers the types of signalling available with Lorentz-invariant
signalling media.
Finally, it is somewhat curious that Maudlin does not discuss the various proofs to the effect
that manipulation of entangled quantum systems cannot be used to signal faster than light. Here,
again, it would seem that Maudlin nods to Bell, as they both cite the existence of equal-time
commutation relations of relativistic Þeld theory as evidence for the fact that one cannot send
signals faster than light (see Bell, 1975, 61 and Maudlin, 2002, 86). However, this begs the (open)
question as to the relevance of equal-time commutation relations to the quantization of a classical
theory in which disturbances propagate outside the lightcone, not to mention the difficult questions
raised by Beckman, et al. (2001) and Sorkin (1993) as to the acausal properties of certain
quantum measurements.
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